North Dakota Law Review
Volume 5

Number 3

Article 7

1928

Business with a Public Interest
North Dakota Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr

Recommended Citation
North Dakota Law Review (1928) "Business with a Public Interest," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 5 : No.
3 , Article 7.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol5/iss3/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

BAR BRIEFS
courts to protect themselves and the public against such acts .... A fraction of one per cent of the attorneys and, I believe, a very small percentage of the police, bring condemnation upon our system of law."
This is not the ranting of some Bolshevik, nor the vaporing of a
social idealist, nor even the criticism of a disgruntled layman who has
just lost a case. It comes from the President of a bar association of
some standing in the country, who directs attention to the matter involved because, as he puts it, "The office of President opens one's eyes
to many things which the average practicing lawyer gives no thought to,"
and because, "There is a real necessity for intimate study of and contact
with the actual and practical administration of criminal law."
"Many of us," continues the statement, "have never attended a
municipal court session, know nothing of the various departments, or the
manner in which that court handles its criminal work. It is in connection with those courts, largely, that the general public gains its conception
of law as administered in this country."
It must be conceded that anything which even remotely tends to
the establishment of practices that convey to the public the thought that
there is one law for the rich and another for the poor, is to be condemned
-and not only condemned, but guarded against with all of the ingenuity,
power and prestige of an organized Bar.
Most of the illustrative cases cited are found, as in this instance, to
come from congested centers, and we have the boldness to suggest that
the very large majority of them would not prove to be "typical examples"
of conditions in our own commonwealth. Judged by the character of
the complaints that have been made against North Dakota attorneys
during the past five years, at any rate, our State is to be congratulated
upon the rather high standards maintained by the profession. However,
it is to be remembered that a Code is just a Code. It does not and can
not enforce itself. Hence, a frequent reading and a sincere personal
application of Rule XXII of our Code of Professional Ethics would not
be amiss; at least, it should not be overlooked, if we expect to retain our
position upon that high plane.

BUSINESS WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST
In the March, 1928, issue of Bar Briefs we reviewed some of the
cases dealing with questions relating to business when affected with a
public interest. The Supreme Court of the United States has, since
Tyson vs. Banton, 47 Sup. St. 426, again dealt with the subject in
Williams vs. Standard Oil Co., Adv. Op. 141.

The case relates to a Tennessee statute regulating the price at which
gasoline was to be sold in that State, and the Court says:

"By repeated decisions of this Court, beginning with Munn vs.
Illinois,... that phrase, (affected with. a public interest) however it may
be characterized, has become the established test by-which the legislative
power to fix prices of commodities, use of property, or services must be
measured. As applied in particular instances, its meaning may be considered both from an affirmative and a negative point of view. Affirmatively, it means that a business or property, in order to be affected with

a public interest, must be such or be so employed as to justify the con-
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clusion that it has been devoted to a public use and its use thereby in effect
granted to the public.. . . Negatively, it does not mean that a business
is affected with a public interest merely because it is large or because
the public are warranted in having a feeling or concern in respect of its
maintenance ....

The meaning and application of the phrase are exam-

ined at length in the Tyson case, and we see no reason for restating what
is there said.
"In support of the act under review it is urged that gasoline is of
widespread use; that enormous quantities of it are sold in the State of
Tennessee; and that it has become necessary and indispensable in carrying on commercial and other activities within the State. But we are here
concerned with the character of the business, not with its size or the
extent to which the commodity is used. Gasoline is one of the ordinary
commodities of trade, differing, so far as the question here is affected,
in no essential respect from a great variety of other articles commonly
bought and sold by merchants and private dealers in the country. The
decisions referred to above make it perfectly clear that the business of
dealing in such articles, irrespective of its extent, does not come within
the phrase 'affected with a public interest'."

HUMAN RIGHTS-PROPERTY RIGHTS
The phrases "human rights" and "property rights," always more
or less in evidence, are receiving particular consideration just now by
reason of the introduction of the Norris and Shipstead bills in Congress.
One may assume, no doubt, that the inference intended to be drawn
from the use of these two phrases is that there are two classes of rights,
and that there is a peculiar difference between them.
Frankly, we do not know of any property that has rights. We do
know of the right to pursue happiness; we know that, in exercising the
right to pursue happiness, men make use of property; we know, also,
that the right to make legitimate use of property is just as intimately
associated with the human individual as the right to life or liberty.
A denial of the right to make legitimate use of property may not
destroy the property, but what good is it to the individual if he is not
permitted to use it? Are there really two classes of rights, then, except
through the making of arbitrary distinctions, so as to justify the limitation of preventive remedies to one or the other?

WE APOLOGIZE
A practical "jokee" misplaced her fingers when the notice was sent
to Mr. H. F. Homer of Fargo, advising him of his appointment as
Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Citizenship, the designation reading,
"Vice-Chairman for the First Congregational District." Mr. Homer
claims to be a "howling Methodist," insists that we assume responsibility
for the error, and demands that we give proper publicity to the correction.
Fear of what may otherwise be in store for us causes us to make this
public apology. As we are in the same category as Mr. Homer, however,
we are not certain whether the apology should be to Mr. Homer or to
the Congregational District, so we just apologize generally.

